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Vollaro: Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy and its Evidentiary Problems

NOTE
MUNCHAUSEN SYNDROME BY PROXY
AND ITS EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS
I. INTRODUCTION

In our social climate of heightened public awareness, extensive
social services, and child care systems, the abuse of children still
persists. Each year, over one million children in the United States are
abused'-700,000 of these children are neglected or maltreated,
300,000 physically abused, and another 140,000 abused sexually.2
Between 2,000 and 5,000 of these abused children die of their injuries.3
When people use the term "child abuse," it conjures images of
broken bones, cigarette bums, bruises, bite marks, handprints,4 lacerations, welts, and abdominal and head injuries.' However, child abuse
does not consist only of physical injuries. The National Committee
for the Prevention of Child Abuse6 defines child abuse as "a
nonaccidental injury or pattern of injuries to a child."' 7 Physical
abuse, physical neglect, sexual abuse, emotional abuse, and
Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy can all constitute child abuse.8
Physical abuse of children is the most obvious to society because
the damage to the child is easily detectable. Another form of child
abuse, sexual abuse, "can range from exhibitionism and fondling to

1. Council on Scientific Affairs, AMA Diagnostic and Treatment Guidelines Concerning
Child Abuse and Neglect, 254 JAMA 796, 796 (1985).
2. Dennis M. Marcus & Daniel M. Albert, Recognizing Child Abuse, 110 ARCHIVES

766, 766 (1992).
3. Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 1, at 796.
4. Marcus & Albert, supra note 2, at 767.
5. Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 1, at 797.
6. The National Committee for the Prevention of Child Abuse (the "NCPCA") is a
private organization founded in 1972 by Donna Stone. Ms. Stone was alarmed by the growing incidence of child abuse in the country, and felt that the public needed to be educated
about this abuse. 'Hence, she established the NCPCA.
OPHTHALMOLOGY

7. Kerrie Marzo, Anatomical Simulator of the Most Common Physical Signs of Child
Abuse, 107 PUB. HEALTH REP. 218, 218 (1992).
8. Id.
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intercourse or [the] use of a child in . . . pornographic materials."9
Emotional abuse is the most difficult to diagnose ° because there are
no tangible marks. It usually takes the form of verbal attacks-teasing, belittling, and badgering." The most common form
of abuse seems to be physical neglect. 2 It involves a failure to meet
the child's basic fundamental needs, including food, shelter, clothing,
schooling, and medical care. 3 Unfortunately, these forms of child
abuse are all too familiar to us. A form of child abuse that is less
familiar, but equally insidious, is Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy
("MSBP"). 4 Part I of this Note will explain MSBP, its characteristics and its effects on children, ranging from death to extended hospitalization. Part III will discuss the variety of evidentiary problems encountered when attempting to label this child abuse as MSBP. Section
A will set out the two patterns in which courts have taken action
concerning MSBP-the "introduced pattern" and the "other factors
pattern." Weaved throughout this section will be the importance of
allowing expert testimony on this subject. Section A(l) addresses
MSBP in the criminal context, examining it as the motive for the
crime. Section A(2) concerns New York's res ipsa loquitur standard
in the family court context. Section B focuses on other problems
which also might be encountered when dealing with MSBP. These
include MSBP's absence from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
9.
10.
11.
12.

Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 1, at 798.
See id. at 798-99.
Id. at 798.
See id.

13.

Id.

14. Baron Karl Fredrick Von Munchausen was an Eighteenth Century mercenary turned
storyteller. His extravagant tales, which were derived from his adventures with the Russian
army, entertained and amused his friends. Rudolph Eric Raspe, one of the Baron's friends
published the pamphlet entitled "Baron Munchausen's Narrative of his Marvellous Travels and
Campaigns in Russia." It was loosely based upon the Baron's original tales, but it "gave new
literary measure to fabulous (and fabulously Onlikely) adventure." Donna A. Rosenberg, Web
of Deceit: A Literature Review of Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy, 11 CHILD ABUSE &

NrGLECT 547, 547-48 (1987); see also Albert L. Mehl et al., Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy: A Family Affair, 14 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 577 (1990).

The term Munchausen Syndrome ("MS") was coined in 1951 by Dr. Richard Asher to
describe an adult psychiatric disorder where medical histories and illnesses were completely
fabricated. These medical tales were similar to the Baron's exaggerated stories and therefore
the disorder was named for him.
In 1977, Dr. Roy Meadow was the first to describe MSBP. The difference between
this and MS is that the afflicted adult does not make himself sick; instead, the psychological
disorder is manifested through fabricating the illness of another, typically the individual's
child, hence "by proxy." The child is not afflicted with the disorder, but is the victim. See
People v. Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. 703 (Ct. App. 1981); Rosenberg, supra.
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of Mental Disorders, and distinguishing between MSBP mothers and

overprotective mothers. Part IV includes recommendations to the legal
community, the courts, and the legislatures. It also advocates that

New York's res ipsa loquitur standard be adopted by all family
courts.
II. MUNCHAUSEN SYNDROME BY PROXY
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy is considered the most baffling
and bizarre form of child abuse by all those who encounter it. In
simple terms, it can be described as medical abuse. The syndrome
consists of a parent continually rushing her child to the hospital with
complaints ranging from excessive vomiting and diarrhea to apnea
and seizures. I" The child is generally very young, usually under two
years of age. 6 Doctors treating the child are quite confused by this
persistent and recurring illness. In attempting to diagnose the illness,
the child is subjected to extended hospitalizations, and countless unnecessary, invasive, and potentially harmful procedures 7 which lead
to no conclusive results. The reason for this inconclusiveness is that
the child's medical history, illness, and symptoms have all been fabricated by a parent or someone in loco parentis."5 These fabrications

15. See Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 552. Excessive vomiting and diarrhea are caused
by the non-accidental poisoning of the child. Roy Meadow, Non-Accidental Salt Poisoning, 68
J. BRIT. PAEDIATRIC ASSOC. 448, 448 (1993). The mother can use therapeutic and prescription drugs such as laxatives, hypnotics, or anticonvulsants, or a household product such as
table salt. Id. These products can be placed directly in the child's mouth, added to the
child's bottle, or added to the tubes attached to the child while in the hospital. Id. at 449.
Apnea is the cessation of breathing during sleep. MERCY MEDICAL CENTER, INFANT
APNEA CENTER PAMPHLET [hereinafter MERCY PAMPHLET]. A mother can induce this condi-

tion by pinching the child's nose, placing her hand over the child's face, or by choking the
child. Michael J. Light & Mary S. Sheridan, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy and Apnea
(MBPA), 29 CLINICAL PEDIATRICS 162 (1990). The mother can also fabricate this illness by

lying to the doctor about its occurrence.
Seizure disorders, also known as epilepsy, are a disorder of the brain's cerebral function "characterized by sudden, brief attacks of altered consciousness, motor activity, sensory
phenomena, or inappropriate behavior." THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY

1311 (Robert Berkow et al. eds., 14th ed. 1982). A mother can induce a seizure through the
partial suffocation of her child. Light & Sheridan, supra, at 163. Here again, the mother can
merely present to the doctor a convincing history of seizures. This will cause the doctor to
prescribe anticonvulsant medications and to do further testing. Roy Meadow, ABC of Child
Abuse: Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy, 299 BRIT. MED. J. 248, 249 (1989).

16. Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
17. Keith L. Kaufman et al., Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: A
Professionals' Knowledge, 13 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 141, 142 (1989).

Survey

of

18. See Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 548.
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can occur in one of two ways. First, although the child actually vomits or ceases to breath, these symptoms are induced by some type of

parental action. For instance, sodium can be added to formula to
cause excessive diarrhea and vomiting, 9 or a piece of plastic or a
hand can be placed over a child's mouth and nose to cause the child
to stop breathing. Hence, medical symptoms appear. Second, the
parent could present to the doctor a history of illness in the child that
simply does not exist. This can be done by describing a seizure
which never happened. The doctor, relying on this information from

the parent, will immediately place the child on medication and then
perform a variety of tests.
Typically, the perpetrator of this form of child abuse is the

mother,2 but fathers can also be the catalyst. 2' Mothers who induce
this form of child abuse will generally "'transfer their own unmet
parental needs ...

onto pediatricians, nurses, spouses, maybe even

the community and get from these people through their child's illness
the attention and sympathy they never got from their own parents.' 22 Often, the mother has some type of medical background'
and "thrive[s] in ...
[the] medical environment,"'24 knowing her

19. Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08.
20. Id. at 709.
21. Adel F. Makar & Paula J. Squier, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: Father as Perpetrator, 85 PEDIATRICS 370 (1990). There are no statistics available as to the percentage of
male MSBP perpetrators because only a few studies have identified this occurrence. See, e.g.,
V. Faye Jones et al., The Role of the Male Caretaker in Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 32
CLINCIAL PEDIATRICS 245 (1993); Makar & Squier, supra. These fathers are the dominant
figures in the hospital-asking the questions and knowing the details of the child's illness.
Makar & Squier, supra at 372. The mother tends to be passive in her relationship with the
father as well as with the hospital staff. Id. This Note will use the term "mother" and the
pronouns "she" and "her," since in the overwhelming majority of cases the mother is the
perpetrator.
22. Phillips, 175 Cal Rptr. at 709 (quoting the testimony of Dr. Martin Blinder, a psychiatrist), The psychological literature seems to suggest that the mother/physician relationship
is that of a power struggle. These women are thought to have been emotionally neglected
and psychologically abandoned by their uninterested mothers and unavailable fathers. See
Herbert A. Schreier, The Perversion of Mothering: Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 56 BULLETIN OF THE MENNINGER CLINIC 421, 433 (1992). They also feel "'a sense of disappointment and betrayal by those whom they felt had the power to give to them when they were
in need."' Id. at 428 (quoting Ben Bursten, Some Narcissistic Personality Types, 54 INT'L J.
PSYCHO-ANALYSIS 287, 293 (1973)). These feelings cause the women to seek out a kindly
physician whom they view as a powerful figure who shares their emotional space, values
their opinion, and admires them. Id.
23. In re Jessica Z., 515 N.Y.S.2d 370, 371 (Fam. Ct. 1987).
24. Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 557.
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child's medical history with extreme accuracy,s becoming friendly
with staff and other parents, sometimes spending more time with hos-

pital personnel than with her child, and being very calm when told

about extensive procedures that will be done to the child. 6 The

mother and child will also develop a symbiotic relationship.
MSBP is difficult to detect because "most health professionals do
28
not expect overprotectiveness to manifest itself as child abuse."
Moreover, the concern, competence, and intelligence of these mothers,
combined with a doctor's training to listen to parents when diagnos-

ing children, 9 makes it difficult for doctors to suspect a mother as
the possible cause of her child's illness.30 Once the diagnosis is

made and the mother is confronted, she becomes outraged and vehemently denies any wrongdoing.3' Yet when the mother is separated
from32the child, the symptoms and signs of the child's illness disappear.
MSBP is an under-recognized form of child abuse that "seems as
preposterous to most people today as child sexual abuse seemed
[twenty] years ago. 33 And yet it is being recorded with increasing
frequency. 3' This suggests that it is more common and occurs on a
larger scale than was previously suspected.35

25. See id. at 548.
26. Jessica Z, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 374-75.
27. Id. at 374-75; Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 548. A symbiotic relationship has been
defined as being "without clear definition between mother and child and their respective
needs." In re Aaron S., Nos. N-671-92, N-676-92, N-678-92 and N-677-92, slip op. at 4
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. Suffolk County Feb. 22, 1993).
28. Basil J. Zitelli et al., Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy and Its Professional Participants, 141 AM. J. DISEAsES CHILDREN 1099, 1101 (1987).
29. See Roy Meadow, Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy: The Hitherland of Child Abuse,
2 LANCET 343 (1977).
30. See People v. Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. 703, 708 (Ct. App. 1981); Meadow, supra
note 29.
31. Jessica Z, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
32. Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 708; In re Aaron S., Nos. N-671-92, N-676-92, N-678-92
and N-677-92, slip op. at 4 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Suffolk County Feb. 22, 1993); Jessica Z, 515
N.Y.S. 2d at 371.
33. Tona L. McGuire & Kenneth W. Feldman, Psychologic Morbidiy of Children Subjected to Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 83 PEDIATRICs 289, 292 (1989).
34. Id. at 289.
35. See Kaufman et al., supra note 17, at 144-45; Mehl et al., supra note 14, at 582;
Herbert Schreier & Judith A. Libow, Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy: Diagnosis and Prevalence, 63 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 318, 319 (1993).
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III. EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS
When attempting to introduce MSBP as the form of abuse the

child has suffered, a variety of obstacles await. These include objections to the relevancy and admissibility of expert testimony, the defendant/mother's mental state not being an issue, and MSBP not'
being a recognized illness.
A. Patterns
Two distinct evidentiary patterns have evolved around MSBP in
case law.36 Some courts consider a child to be abused if his or her
parent is found to have introduced a foreign substance into the child
to create the illusion of a medical illness.37 This Note will use the
term "introduced pattern" to describe this type of fact pattern. The
introduced pattern has been dealt with in both criminal and family
courts. However, it is often very difficult to prove that the parents
have forced a foreign substance into the child's system. The term
"other factors pattern" will be used to describe instances where the
courts took some type of action despite the lack of proof of the parent inducing the symptoms. It involves suggesting that MSBP exists,
and then proving a variety of other factors, such as poor family stability.38 This pattern is not used in the criminal courts because it
does not produce enough evidence to fulfill the beyond a reasonable
doubt burden of proof.
1. Introduced Pattern
The introduced pattern includes not only the situation where a
mother directly introduces substances into the child's system, but also
illnesses such as apnea, in which the child's normal functioning has
been disrupted by some action on the part of the mother.
a. Criminal Context
The criminal courts use the introduced pattern in cases where
MSBP is the catalyst for the crime.39 Thus, if there is some evidence

36. In re Bowers, No. 92-1490, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 49, at *10 (Jan. 2, 1992)
(holding evidence of MSBP to be insufficient to find the child to be a dependent and/or
neglected child).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., People v. Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. 703 (Ct. App. 1981).
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that a foreign substance was introduced into the child's system, a
conviction is extremely likely. However, even where there is evidence
to link a mother to the abuse of her child, the prosecution may still
have a problem with the admissibility of expert testimony relating to
40
MSBP.
The problem of the admissibility of expert testimony first arose
in California. In 1981, Priscilla Phillips was found guilty of murdering one of her daughters by introducing a sodium compound into her
system and of willfully endangering the life and health of another
daughter by the same means.4' This case involved a classic example
of MSBP. The first adopted daughter, Tia, was continually hospitalized for vomiting and diarrhea. All the medical tests performed
showed no abnormalities'except a blood test which revealed "abnor'
mally high levels of blood serum sodium, and of bicarbonate. 42
A
little over a year after Tia's illness was diagnosed, she was dead. The
San Francisco Coroner's office labeled the cause of death as sodium
poisoning. 43 The doctors, though baffled by the circumstances of
Tia's death, never suspected her mother as the cause of the illness.
Thus, the authorities were not notified and no charges were filed.
Shortly after Tia's death, the Phillips' adopted another daughter,
Mindy, who on various occasions was also hospitalized for vomiting
and diarrhea. Her blood tests also showed elevated sodium levels.
This time the pediatrician took a second look-two children, from the
same family but who were not blood related, suffered from the same
mysterious illness. Mindy's formula was then analyzed, and "[t]he
sodium content was 448 milliequivalents per liter. According to the
manufacturer's specification, the sodium content should have been
only 15 milliequivalents per liter."' Mindy was placed in the Intensive Care Unit. Her mother was not permitted to feed her, and was
only allowed supervised visits. 4 The symptoms eventually subsided
and Mindy's health was restored.
After this incident, Child Protective Services was notified and
charges relating to the abuse of both daughters were filed. As part of

40. See State v. Lumbrera, 845 P.2d 609 (Kan. 1992).
41. Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 705.
42.
tem, see
43.
44.

Id. at 705-07. For a description of how sodium is introduced into the child's syssupra note 15.
Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
Id.

45. The parents of hospitalized children are usually allowed to take part in their care by
administering feedings and/or staying overnight in the child's room. See id.
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the prosecution's case, it was suggested that MSBP was the motive
for Phillips' conduct.' Dr. Martin Blinder, a psychiatrist, was called
to testify as to the symptoms and signs of MSBP. Dr. Blinder never
examined Phillips and had never treated anyone with this disorder; his

testimony was based solely on reports he had read in various medical
journals.47 On appeal, defense counsel asserted that the trial court
erred in allowing the expert testimony to be admitted based solely on

reports of others, rather than personal4 observations of the defendant or
other persons diagnosed with MSBP.

1

The California Court of Appeals found the expert testimony to
be relevant and admissible for two reasons. First, even though the
defendant did not make her mental state an issue in the case, the
psychiatric testimony showed a motivational element.49 Second, the
court found that the testimony fell within the confines of Section 801
of the California Evidence Code.5" The court reasoned that even
though Dr. Blinder's testimony was largely based on reports by others

rather than on his own observations, this affected the weight of his
testimony, not the admissibility of it, since the reports met the reasonable reliability standard.5 Dr. Blinder relied on six sources from
the United States and England, including a work by Dr. Roy Meadow
(a leading expert on MSBP), an article in the Journal of the American Medical Association, and a report in Pediatrics.2 These sources
46. Id.
47, Id.
48. Id. at 712.
49. Although motive is not a required element which needs to be proven in a criminal
case, it strengthens the prosecution's argument and also assists the jury when forming its
decision. See Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 414-15 (1894) ("It is not an element of
the burden of proof . . . that a motive or inducement to commit the offence [sic] should be
proved."); see also United States v. Brown, 518 F.2d 821, 828 (7th Cir. 1975).
50. This section describes the boundaries of expert testimony:
If a witness is testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is
limited to such an opinion as is:
(a) Related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that
the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact; and
(b) Based on matter (including his special knowledge, skill, experience,
training, and education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made
known to him at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a
type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon
the subject to which his testimony relates, unless an expert is precluded by law
from using such matter as a basis for his opinion.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (West 1967) (emphasis added); see also FED. R. EvID. 702, 703.
51. Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13.
52. Id. at 713 n.l. These articles were among the first written on the subject of MSBP.
Dr. Meadow's article described two MSBP cases and continued by describing the MSBP
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met the reasonable reliability standard because they were published in
reputable medical journals, which the medical community itself looked
to for the most up-to-date information.
Even though an expert witness may not be personally familiar
with MSBP-as was the case in Phillips-the witness should still be
permitted to testify. The medical and legal professions themselves are
just becoming familiar with MSBP. If it is not within the common
knowledge of these two communities, it is highly unlikely that the
jurors would have heard of, much less be able to understand,
MSBP.53 This testimony shows that the actions taken by the mother
are not only peculiar, but also a recognized form of child abuse. The
jury should be allowed to see this "parent" in her true light-as an
abuser.
In another case involving MSBP, Commonwealth v. Robinson,'4
an eleven month old boy died due to massive salt intoxication. The
evidence showed that the mother had access both to large amounts of
salt and to the child's formula; her fingerprints were discovered on a
few salt packets, a bottle laced with salt was discovered among her
belongings, and she knew the child was suffering from salt ingestion
before the staff informed her of this diagnosis.5 Even though the
introduced pattern was evident in this case, the judge granted a motion in limine which deprived the jury of hearing relevant expert
testimony concerning MSBP 6 Despite the omission of this testimony, the defendant was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter in the
death of her son.
Although the mother was convicted in Robinson, in another case
a jury may not believe that a mother would intentionally make her
child ill or blatantly lie to a doctor concerning her child's health.57

mother as thriving in the medical environment. Meadow, supra note 29, at 343. The article
in the Journal of the American Medical Association, which described Meadow's findings, was
used to inform American doctors about MSBP. Samuel Vaisrub, Baron Munchausen and the
Abused Child, 239 JAMA 752 (1978).
53. The court in In re Bowers recognized "the difficulty which the trier of fact may
experience in distinguishing between a parent with [MSBP] and one who is merely overprotective of a minor medical problem," and concluded that credibility of the expert testimony

would be a key factor for the jury. No. 92-1490, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 49, at *14 (Jan. 2,
1992).
54. 565 N.E.2d 1229 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
55. Id. at 1236.
56. The case does not explain the courts rationale for granting the motion in limine.
57. See In re Bowers, No. 92-1490, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 49, at *14 (Jan. 2, 1992)
(discussing the difficulty a jury might encounter).
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Thus, a guilty mother might go free. To eliminate this possibility, the
expert testimony about MSBP should be allowed.5
The Supreme Court of Kansas has recently reversed and remand-

ed a first degree murder conviction in a case in which MSBP played
a large role. 9 The state's opening statement put forth MSBP as a
possible motive for the killing.' An expert witness, a pathologist,
testified and gave a broad definition of MSBP.6 On a motion by the

defense, all MSBP testimony was stricken from the record because
the state did not present any evidence that the defendant suffered

58. In cases like Phillips where the mother's conduct exceeds the bounds of child abuse
and becomes homicide, an insanity type defense might be used. Although this Note does not
address the use of MSBP as a defense, it is very likely that it could be so used. The Model
Penal Code will be used for a brief analysis of an MSBP insanity defense, since the insanity
statutes vary among the states. See R.D. Mackay, Post-Hinckley Insanity in the U.S.A., CRIM.
L. REV. 88 (1988). The Code states that "[a] person is not responsible for criminal conduct
if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Official Draft 1962).
An MSBP mother cannot fulfill the cognitive prong of the defense. The woman is not
hallucinating, knows her conduct is wrong, and purposely and intentionally continues on this
destructive course. The intended result of MSBP abuse is for the child to become extremely
ill, in some cases to cease breathing for a short period, and to end up under a doctor's care,
preferably in a hospital. An MSBP mother knows that her actions will definitely cause harm
to her child, and possibly death. The mother's concern, however, is not for her child's wellbeing as she claims, but instead to receive the "attention" she desires. Again, this is a conscious, well thought out plan with a goal, not a deranged hallucination.
Even though the mother understood her conduct to be wrong, she could still fulfill the
volitional prong. She would need to present some type of evidence to show that she could
not successfully refrain from her behavior. For example, if there are older children who were
not abused, then she would have a great deal of difficulty meeting this prong. If there are
older children, however, who were abused or other children who died under mysterious circumstances, the chances of success for the insanity defense increase because although she
knows her actions are wrong, she cannot control them.
Many states, especially since the John Hinckley Jr. verdict in 1982, have reconsidered
their insanity plea. See Mackay, supra at 88. For example, the New York insanity plea is an
affirmative defense which has no volitional prong, thus making it exceedingly difficult for an
MSBP mother to succeed with the defense. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 & cmt. (McKinney
1987).
59. State v. Lumbrera, 845 P.2d 609, 619-20 (Kan. 1992) (reversing and remanding on
grounds not including the stricken MSBP testimony).
60. Id. at 618-19.
61. Id. at 619. The witness described MSBP as occurring
when . . . a parent would inflict on a child an illness or fake symptoms of an illness in order for the parent to be the center of attention or gain sympathy, and
they gain that through the child; and the child is the one with the fake illness or
the fake symptoms.
Id. (quoting Dr. Eva Vachal).
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from the condition.62 But should the testimony have been stricken?
In Phillips, there was no direct testimony that the defendant
suffered from MSBP. A hypothetical question was posed63 and the
answer indicated that the defendant "'evince[d] symptoms consistent
with ... Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy,"'" 6 but the expert stated he "could not render an opinion concerning [the] appellant herself,
because he had never examined her."'65 The expert testimony in
Lumbrera should not have been stricken. Lumbrera was on trial for
manslaughter, not manslaughter by MSBP. MSBP was only one of
many factors in the case; thus, the state did not have to prove that
she suffered from MSBP. It was enough to show that this form of
child abuse exists. The state's expert was being used "to teach the
jurors scientific ... principles they [might] need to evaluate the facts
in the case."' Kansas also allows expert testimony to be used for
this purpose. In Sterba v. Jay, the court ruled that "[e]xpert opinion
testimony is admissible if it will be of special help to the jury on
technical subjects as to which the jury is not familiar or if such testimony would assist the jury in arriving at a reasonable factual conclusion from the evidence."'67 The expert explained the syndrome without applying it to the facts of the case. The jury, through this testimony and the other evidence presented, should have been permitted
to draw its own conclusions.
Expert testimony in the criminal context is crucial to cases involving MSBP.68 Juries need this information to have a better understanding of the events that transpired, and to reach a verdict beyond a
reasonable doubt. This is important because a juror may not believe
that a parent would harm her child in this manner, and thus have
difficulty in reaching a decision. The MSBP testimony will aid a
juror in realizing that the alleged crime is a result of child abuse.
This circumstantial evidence will facilitate the juror's deliberations.

62. Id.
63. The defense objected to the hypothetical question but the trial judge allowed it. The
appeals court upheld the hypothetical question on the grounds that the expert made it clear
that he could not make a diagnosis of defendant. People v. Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. 703, 711
(Ct. App. 1981).
64. Id. (quoting the testimony of Dr. Martin Blinder).
65. Id.
66. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRE[D, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 221 (2d ed. 1989).
67. 816 P.2d 379, 388 (Kan. 1991); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-456 (1992).
68. See In re Aaron S., Nos. N-671-92, N-676-92, N-678-92 and N-677-92, slip op. at
36 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Suffolk County Feb. 22, 1993) (the deciding issue for the court was the
credibility of the expert testimony).
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Judges also need to be equipped with this information when
sentencing a defendant, and when making recommendations for counseling or parenting classes. Furthermore, MSBP testimony should also
be preserved in the record for its precedential value. The MSBP form
of child abuse is something with which courts are not extremely
familiar, and thus they may be hesitant to allow relevant testimony in.
However, if a court admits this MSBP testimony, other jurisdictions
may be more inclined to also allow the same type of testimony. This
precedential effect will help the legal system educate itself concerning
MSBP.
Another reason for preservation in the record is, if the case is
appealed, the higher court will be aware that the incident was not just
a freak accident but a continuing form of child abuse. Additionally, if
the mother moves to a different jurisdiction and is arrested there for
harming another child, the preserved record could inform the prosecutor of the existence of MSBP-since it is a very new and unusual
disorder. The prosecutor may not have otherwise focused on it. By
viewing the record, the prosecutor will learn about the details of
MSBP and discern the evidence in the present case is very similar to
what is in the court record. The prosecutor may then decide to further
investigate this form of child abuse, and may even present expert
testimony on the abuse.69
b. Family Court Context
Each state has its own grounds for removal of children from
their home, either on a temporary or permanent basis. These commonly focus on the best interests of the child. Abuse is clearly contrary to the best interests of any child, and is therefore strong grounds
for removal. In Maryland and New York, when MSBP is found,
courts have placed children in temporary protective custody. Such
cases contain strong circumstantial evidence that a foreign substance
was introduced into the child, and thus follow the introduced pattern.7"

69. See, e.g., State v. Lumbrera, 845 P.2d 609, 614-15 (Kan. 1992); Woods v. Depart-

ment of Social Services, 272 A.2d 92, 94 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971). Although the Woods
case does not mention MSBP, the court considered the fact that five other children had died

due to breathing difficulty when left in this mother's care. id. This case occurred in 1971,
prior to Meadow's first description of MSBP. See supra note 14. Thus, there is a possibility
that MSBP played a role in these deaths-this "breathing difficulty" was perhaps a form of

induced apnea.
70. See, e.g., Aaron S., Nos. N-671-92, N-676-92, N-678-92 and N-677-92; In re Colin
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In a Maryland case, In re Colin R., three year old Colin was
continually hospitalized for vomiting, dehydration, high urinary output, and low potassium levels.' Colin did not respond to any of the
conventional medical treatments.72 The doctors were mystified, but
decided to perform one more procedure, a urine test, which revealed
the presence of diuretics in Colin's system. All medications and
unsupervised visits were immediately discontinued.74 Colin's symptoms ceased and his urine tests were normal. His mother fit the
classic MSBP mother-a licensed nurse who vehemently denied any
knowledge of how the diuretics entered Colin's system.76 Colin was
ultimately found to be a victim of MSBP, and social services were
contacted.' In connection with the pending case, the Sheriffs Department was granted a search warrant for the parents' home.78 The
search revealed a hypodermic syringe and two vials of the diuretic
Lasix in the mother's bedroom dresser drawer.79
The trial court declared Colin to be a "child in need of assistance"8 and placed him under the protective supervision of social
services." The trial court was convinced that Colin's mother had
engaged in conduct-the improper administration of drugs-which
threatened his permanent health and life." This conclusion can be
attributed to the testimony of Colin's treating physicians, the hospital
record, and the other evidence presented. It was also in line with
Maryland's desire "to separate a child from his parents ... when
necessary for his welfare."'
New York has applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur "to
R., 493 A.2d 1083 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985); In re Jessica Z., 515 N.Y.S.2d 370 (Fam. Ct.
1987).
71. Colin R., 493 A.2d at 1085.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1086.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. A child in need of assistance is defined as "a child who requires the assistance of
the court because (1) He . . . is not receiving ordinary and proper care and attention, and
(2) [h]is parents . . . are unable or unwilling to give proper care and attention to the
...
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-801(e) (Supp. 1989).
child.
81. Colin R., 493 A.2d at 1085.
82. Id. at 1091.
83. Id. at 1086, 1089-90.
84.

MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-802(a)(3) (Supp. 1989).

85. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is found in section 1046(a)(ii) of New York's Family
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explain specific injuries of children by strong inferences of abuse...
where the parent has primary custody during the critical period when
injury was sustained."86 This doctrine has been used in two cases
involving MSBP.
In In re Jessica Z., a little girl was repeatedly hospitalized over
a four month period for diarrhea, dehydration, and a blood infection.
Jessica's symptoms subsided when she was in the Intensive Care
Unit, but as soon as she was transferred to a private room to which
her parents had access, her symptoms returned. 7 At this point, her
doctors became suspicious and ordered a chemical test that revealed
the presence of laxatives in her system.88 The doctors immediately
contacted Child Protective Services and the mother was charged with
"intentionally inflicted physical injury upon her infant daughter, ...
creating a substantial risk of death, disfigurement or impairment of
her physical and emotional health."89
Conflicting expert testimony was presented concerning the cause
of Jessica's illness. Dr. Leonard Newman, the Chief of Pediatric
Gastroenterology at Westchester County Medical Center, and Jessica's
treating physician, concluded that Jessica was an MSBP child.' He
based this conclusion on his personal observations of Jessica, his prior
contact with MSBP cases, and on the fact that a vast number of
MSBP characteristics were present in Jessica's relationship with her
mother.9 ' The other witness, Dr. Frederick Daum, Chief of Pediatric
Gastroenterology at Northshore University Hospital, felt that Jessica's
persisting illness could have been caused by complications from a
prior operation.9" Dr. Daum had never encountered MSBP before and

Court Act:
[P]roof of injuries sustained by a child or of the condition of a child of such a
nature as would ordinarily not be sustained or exist except by reason of the acts
or omissions of the parent or other person responsible for the care of such child
shall be prima facie evidence of child abuse or neglect, as the case may be, of the
parent or other person legally responsible.
N.Y. FANi. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(ii) (McKinney 1987) (emphasis added). This doctrine is not
used in the criminal context because of the high burden of proof.
86. hI re Jessica Z., 515 N.Y.S.2d 370, 377 (Fam. Ct. 1987).
87. Id. at 373.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 370-71.
90. Id. at 372, 375-76.
91. Id. at 375. These characteristics included the mother having some medical training, a
symbiotic relationship between the mother and child, and the abatement of the illness when
Jessica was not in her mother's care. Id. at 373-75.
92. Id. at 376.
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based his opinion on a review of Jessica's hospital records and a
short examination of her prior to trial.9 3 Despite this conflicting testimony from two highly qualified pediatric gastroenterologists, the court
found that "Dr. Newman's testimony [was] by far the more persuasive."' It elaborated by stating that
[i]n his role as treating physician, he had the experience of personally observing the child and frequent contact with her other physicians and hospital staff during the period in question. No motive
can be ascribed to his initial diagnosis and immediate report to
Child Protective Services other than his concern for the child's
safety.'
Despite an absence of concrete evidence to establish that
Jessica's mother gave her the laxatives, the court felt that the circumstantial evidence was established by more than the required preponderance, that her mother introduced laxatives into her system,96 and
thus the res ipsa loquitur standard was applied.97
The standard was also used to establish MSBP abuse in the case
of In re Aaron S.," where an eight year old allegedly suffered from
central apnea. Medical records documented this "long and unexplained"99 history of apnea, and revealed that Aaron's mother was
the only witness to these attacks, which had been occurring since
infancy. Based on his mother's credibility,"° Aaron was placed on
an apnea monitor"° ' at six weeks of age. 2 He remained on the
monitor for five months when the Infant Apnea Center0 3 (the
"IAC") decided to discharge him from the program due to his
mother's non-compliance." 4 The IAC's medical records indicate that
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 377.
97. Id.
98. Nos. N-671-92, N-676-92, N-678-92, and N-677-92 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Suffolk County
Feb. 22, 1993).
99. Id. at 6.
100. Ms. S. claimed to be a nurse, and thus her observations were given a great amount
of weight even though testing done on Aaron found no cause for the alleged apnea. Id. at
14-15.
101. An apnea monitor is used at home, tracking the child's heart rate and respiration
during sleep. An alarm sounds if either of these functions falls below a certain level. MERCY
PAMPHLET, supra note 15.
102. Aaron S., Nos. N-671-92, N-676-92, N-678-92, N-677-92, slip op. at 15.
103. IAC is a division of Mercy Medical Center located in Rockville Centre, New York.
See MERCY PAMPHLET, supra note 15.
104. Aaron S., Nos. N-671-92, N-676-92, N-678-92, N-677-92, slip op. at 15-16. As part
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they felt Aaron's mother might be fabricating his history of ap-

nea. 5 The case indicates that Aaron's apnea episodes ceased at one
point, but then started again in 1988 and allegedly continued until
1992."6 During this time, Aaron had been subjected to cardiopulmonary resuscitation and had slept in his mother's bed every night so
she could revive him. 0 7

At a hearing to determine whether Aaron was a neglected child,
five '

of the eight experts called to testify agreed that he was the

victim of MSBP.1r Their conclusions were based on the fact that
his mother fit many of the MSBP characteristics," 0 Aaron's extensive medical history,"' Aaron's siblings' medical records, and his
mother's medical history." 2 But the strongest evidence came from
Aaron's foster mother, who testified that "Aaron has been with her

since August 24, 1992 and that he ha[d] never had an episode of
apnea, [was] not connected nightly to a monitor and sle[pt] in his
own bed.""'

The court used a res ipsa loquitur analysis because of the cumulative circumstantial evidence of abuse and "the dramatic abatement
of [the] illness upon removal from the parent.""' 4 The credibility of
the expert witnesses was one of the key factors in the judge's determination."' The court also noted that "the issue ... [was] a pediatric diagnosis as to [Aaron] and his protection, not a diagnosis as to

of the apnea monitor program, the parent is required to keep records of all alarms and to
stay in contact with the Center. Id. at 16.
105. Id. at 15.
106. See id.
107. Id. at 2.
108. These experts consisted of the Chief of Staff at Schneider Children's Hospital
("Schneider") in New Hyde Park, New York, a neurologist affiliated with Schneider, the
Chief of Critical Care Medicine at Schneider, a psychiatrist and Director of the Family Guidance Center at Children's Hospital Medical Center in Oakland, California, and a pediatrician.
See Id. at 7, 9, 13, 17, 18.
109. Id. at 19.
110. Id. at 17-19.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 96-105.
112. His brother Joshua had suffered from failure to thrive, chronic diarrhea, and seizures. His sister Courtney had been tested for a variety of illnesses, including leukemia, Epstein Barr Syndrome, and connective tissue disorder. Aaron S., slip op. at 35-36. Ms. S. has
been involuntarily admitted to two psychiatric hospitals for a suicide attempt and threats to
harm herself and the children. Id. at 20-22.
113. Id. at 13.
114. Id. at 6.
115. See id. at 38.
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Ms. S.'s mental condition,""' 6 and therefore acknowledged that the
mother's mental condition was not the issue and thus need not be
proved." 7 However, it still allowed the MSBP testimony because it
was a pediatric diagnosis relevant to the health and welfare of the
child."' Thus, if an objection to MSBP testimony is made based on
the premise that the defendant's mental state is not at issue, the court
can still allow the testimony under the relevancy of the child's medical diagnosis.
2. Other Factors Pattern
With the introduced pattern, there is either direct evidence of a
foreign substance being introduced into the body or strong circumstantial evidence that this is what occurred. On the other hand, with
the other factors pattern, the evidence of the fabrication is not as
strong, but there are other problems within the family which lead the
court to conclude that the child should be removed from the home.
So far, the other factors trend has only been applied in the family
court context of custody battles and termination of parental rights. In
determining the best interest of the child, courts not only take into
consideration an MSBP diagnosis, but also the psychological fitness
of each parent as well as other factors, including economic and family stability.
In Place v. Place,"' a father was awarded custody of his two
daughters. 20 The trial court found that the older daughter was the
victim of MSBP and, if placed with her mother, would be subject
"'to repeated and unnecessary and possibly invasive medical investigations. ' 2 ' The mother was found to be a psychologically unstable
parent, and thus, unfit. The court further found the father to be
better able to provide a more psychologically and economically stable
homelife for the girls."
Increasingly, many courts are facing the extremely difficult
choice of whether to terminate a parent's rights to their child. Three

116. Id. at 33.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 525 A.2d 704, 706 (N.H. 1987).
120. Id. at 705.
121. Id. at 709 (quoting the New England Medical Center's psychological evaluation of
the older daughter).
122. Id.
123. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1993

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1993], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:495

states-Alabama, Indiana, and Vermont-have encountered this choice
in instances involving MSBP as a form of child abuse. An Alabama
court terminated parental rights based on child abuse in the form of
MSBP, and the fact that both parents were unemployed and did not
avail themselves of any of the rehabilitative measures offered to
them. 2 4 An Indiana court held that a mother's instability and minimal potential for change, combined with her child's exhibition of selfabuse, the lack of a mother-child bond, and the unnecessary medications administered to the child as the result of MSBP, warranted
termination of the mother's parental rights." In Vermont, a child's
health and safety were found to be in danger due to MSBP and her
parents' failure to acknowledge the syndrome. 26 Based on this and
the child's special needs, 27 inadequate supervision, an alcoholic father, and a mother
suffering from seizures, the court terminated the
28
rights.
parental
B. Other Problems
There are two other problems that might be encountered when
dealing with MSBP cases. First, MSBP is not listed in the American
Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (the "DSM"). Second, there is the difficulty in deciphering
between an overprotective mother, a "help-seeker mother,"' 29 and an
MSBP mother. 30
1. The DSM
The DSM argument was asserted by
Counsel argued that the MSBP testimony
because MSBP was an unrecognized illness
the DSM, and therefore was "'not generally

the defense in Phillips.
should not be admitted
which was not listed in
accepted by the medical

124. Fessler v. State Dep't of Human Resources. 567 So. 2d 301, 302 (Ala. Civ. App.
1989). These rehabilitative measures included job training, vocational services, and various
counseling sessions offered by the Department of Human Resources. Id. at 302.
125. Tucker v. Shelby County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 578 N.E.2d 774 (Ind. Ct. App.

1991).
126.
127.
128.
129.
but her

li re S.R., 599 A.2d 364, 367 (Vt. 1991).
The case does not elaborate on what these special needs might be.
S.R., 599 A.2d at 367-68.
A "help-seeker mother" may also present a child with a factitious orinduced illness,
motivations differ from those of an MSBP mother. Judith A. Libow & Herbert A.
Schreier, Three Forms Of Factitious Illness In Children: When Is It Munchausen Syndrome
by Pro.y?, 56 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 602, 605 (1986).
130. In re Bowers, No. 92-1490, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 49, at *14 (Jan. 2, 1992).
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profession." 1 3' The judge found that this was not a requirement of
the California Rules of Evidence, nor was it a scientific technology
falling within the realm of the Kelly standard. 132 Accordingly, these
objections were overruled, 33 and the expert testimony was admitted.
Since the DSM is widely recognized as the authority on mental disorders, however, such an argument could persuade other courts not to
admit evidence of MSBP.
Although the present version of the DSM, the DSM-III-R, still
does not list MSBP as a disorder," it does contain a section on
factitious disorders. 35 These disorders are "characterized by physical
or psychological symptoms that are intentionally produced or
feigned."'3 6 The description continues by stating that Munchausen
Syndrome is the most well known form of these factitious disorders. 37 Since MSBP is a variant of Munchausen Syndrome, in one
sense the DSM-Ill-R does recognize MSBP.
Also, a listing in the DSM is not dispositive to the existence of
an illness. The DSM-III-R begins with a cautionary statement which
states, in part, that the "diagnostic criteria and the DSM-lI-R classification of mental disorders reflect a consensus of current formulations
of evolving knowledge in our field but do not encompass all the
conditions that may be legitimate objects of treatment or research efforts."' 38 Consequently, the immense amount of medical and psychiatric literature on MSBP confirms its existence,' and is enough to
allow testimony on the disorder to be admitted, as evidenced in Phillips.
Furthermore, one of the proposals for DSM-IV is the addition of
factitious disorders by proxy, which would include MSBP. 4 ° The

131. People v. Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. 703, 713 (Ct. App. 1981) (quoting Appellant's
brief).
132. Id. at 714. The Kelly standard requires a new scientific technique, such as voice
identification, to be generally accepted by the relevant scientific community before it can be
used as evidence in a legal proceeding. People v. Kelly, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148-50 (1976).
133. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
134.

AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL

DISORDERS (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R].
135. Id. at 315-20.
136. Id. at 315.
137. Id. at 316.
138. Id. at xxix (emphasis added).
139. See, e.g., Schreier & Libow, supra note 35, at 318; Rosenberg, supra note 14, at
551.
140. Stuart Taylor & Steven Hyler, Update on Factitious Disorders, 23 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY MED. 81, 85-87 (1993).
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proposed diagnostic criteria for this disorder would be:
A.
B.

Production or feigning of physical signs or symptoms in another person who is under the individual's care.
The motivation for the perpetrator's behavior is a psychological
need to assume the sick role (indirectly) as evidenced by the
absence of external incentives for the behavior, such as economic gain.41

This proposed change further weakens the unrecognized illness argument. If DSM-IV includes factitious disorders by proxy, the entire
argument will be eliminated.
2. The Difference Between MSBP, Over Protective, and HelpSeeker Mothers
It may be hard to convince a fact-finder that an MSBP mother is
not just being overly protective, or a "help-seeker" mother. However,
overprotective mothers and help-seeker mothers can both be distinguished from MSBP mothers, and prosecutors should emphasize these
differences when presenting their cases. Overprotective mothers do not
induce their child's illness or falsify symptoms that do not exist.
Rather, they tend to overreact to symptoms that the child exhibits.
Their motivation is genuine concern for the child's health and wellbeing.
In the case of help-seeker mothers, the frequency of the symptoms and the mother's motivation differ from those of MSBP cases. 4 2 Help-seekers usually present their child with a factitious illness
on one occasion, whereas MSBP mothers continue their actions over
an extended period of time. 3 The motivation of help seeker mothers to deceive the doctor "often involves a realistic need for outside
intervention,"'" due to their feelings of being depressed, exhausted,
or overwhelmed.'45 Their attempts to deceive a doctor about the
child's illness is often easily uncovered by the medical staff.'46 Once

141. Id. at 85 tbl. 2.
142. See supra note 130.

143. Libow & Schreier, supra note 129, at 603, 605.
144. Id. at 605.
145. Id.
146. Id. By contrast, as shown in In re Jessica Z, the problems an MSBP child evidences are sometimes very difficult to distinguish from legitimate health problems. 515 N.Y.S.2d
370, 376 (Fam. Ct. 1987). In that case, the defense presented expert testimony that the
child's problems could have been due to complications of a prior operation. See supra notes
92-93 and accompanying text; see also In re Bowers, No. 92-1490, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS
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the mother is confronted with
one of relief and she is eager
MSBP mother's motivation, on
needs, and she will deny any
child's factitious illness.'

the falsified evidence, her reaction is
to receive outside intervention.47 An
the other hand, is to fulfill her unmet
involvement in or knowledge of her

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The legal community may inadvertently allow MSBP to persist.
In failing to recognize and acknowledge its existence, it fails to protect the already abused child. Since the key problem in many of the
MSBP cases is the lack of incontrovertible evidence to show that the
mother actually administered the foreign substance, the legal and
medical communities should unify their efforts, and attempt to obtain

video taped evidence.'49 Yale-New Haven Hospital in Connecticut
used this approach to confirm its suspicions of MSBP in one in-

stance. 5 A closed circuit camera with a pinhole lens was situated
in the ceiling of the child's hospital room and focused on the bed,

while a monitor was placed in a locked room with access given only
to treating staff.' As a result of this, the mother was observed
three times in a thirty minute period emptying the contents of a syringe into her child's mouth.5 2 The video not only confirmed the
medical staff's suspicions, it also became part of the child's perma-

nent medical record, which could be introduced as evidence'53 in
49, at *14 (Jan. 2, 1992) (identifying the problem a jury may have in "distinguishing between a parent with [MSBP] and one who is merely overprotective").
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 22, 31 and accompanying text.
149. See Mark A. Epstein et al., Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: Considerations in
Diagnosis and Confirmation by Video Sun,eillance, 80 PEDIATRICS 220 (1987); James D.
Frost, Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy and Video Surveillance, 142 AM. J. DIsEASES CHILDREN 917 (1988).
150. Epstein et al., supra note 149, at 220-21.
151. Id. at 221, 223.
152. Id. at 221.

153. This videotape would come in under the hearsay exceptions and thus be admissible
evidence. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business
activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown
by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of
information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trust-
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any proceedings against the mother."5
Courts should be advised that while children of all ages are at
risk for MSBP,5 5 those under age five are considered to be at an
increased risk.'56 This is due to their lack of language and communication skills, and their inability to differentiate between good
parenting and improper parenting.'57 To determine whether a child
suffers from MSBP, courts should consider relevant factors, such as
whether there were other witnesses to the child's episodes of illness
(especially in cases of apnea); 5 ' whether the family has an unusual
medical or psychiatric history, for example, determining if the mother
is a hypochondriac; whether older siblings had similar medical problems when they were infants and if so, whether they are still alive or
what the cause of their death was; whether there is a pattern of doctor shopping (by checking past medical records); and whether the
child has been treated in more than one hospital or in multiple
"' In addition, courts should consider the
states. 59
work and social history of the parents. 16°
Once MSBP has been established, a child should immediately be
removed from the home for two reasons. First, and foremost, the
mortality rate for MSBP victims is nine percent.' Second, even

worthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not
conducted for profit.
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that hospital records
were admissible under Rule 803(6). United States v. Sackett, 598 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir.
1979); see also 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 293 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
However, videotapes may be considered not in the ordinary course of business. Yet it has
been urged that "Rule 803(6) should be interpreted so that the absence of routineness without
more is not sufficiently significant to require exclusion of the record. Nonroutine records
made in the course of a regularly conducted 'business' should be admissible if they meet the
other requirements of Rule 803(6) ....
" 2 JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT § 7.38, at 230 (2d ed. 1992) (quoting 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET
A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
803(6)[03], at 803-182 (1987)).
154. Epstein et al.. supra note 149, at 223.
155. See, e.g., Place v. Place, 525 A.2d 704, 705 (N.H. 1987) (affected children were
seven and thirteen years old).
156. Mehl et al., supra note 14, at 583.
157. Id.
158, In cases of apnea, if the only witness to all of the stop-breathing episodes is the
mother, the likelihood of MSBP increases. Whereas if the child stops breathing in the presence of others, it is more probable that there is a medical explanation.
159. See Rosenberg, supra note 14, at 559.
160. Id.
161. Jay P. Willging et al., Physical Abuse of Children: A Retrospective Review and an
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when a child is removed from the home and thus protected from
further physical injury, the likelihood of severe psychological trauma
remains high." The extent of this trauma will increase the longer
the child remains in the home; therefore, immediate removal will help
to mitigate it.'63 MSBP children are more likely to manifest feeding
disorders, withdrawal, hyperactivity, Munchausen Syndrome, and are
more likely to abuse their own children in the same manner. 64 A
classic example of this is J.H., an MSBP child, who was removed
from foster care and returned to his parents against medical recommendation. 6 His parents had been in psychotherapy, but still did
not acknowledge the MSBP. By age six, he was deemed "out of
control" and had been expelled from a special kindergarten for
behaviorally disturbed children." Another example of this trauma is
found in Aaron S., who has been diagnosed with a conduct disorder
that is manifested through stealing, cruelty to animals, and setting
fires. 67
As of 1989, there was only one case in the medical literature in
which treatment of the mother was successful. 6 This success rate is
not encouraging, nor does it support the option of leaving the child in
the home.
If the court deems it is in the best interests of an MSBP-victimized child to be left in the home, it must lay out an elaborate plan
for supervision. For example, in In re Jessica Z., the court granted
custody of the child to the father with strict supervision.'69 Other
aspects of the court's holding included the mother being placed under
court-ordered psychiatric treatment; the father being placed in therapy;
the examination of Jessica once a month by her treating physician; a
nurse being assigned to assist in Jessica's care; extensive communication ordered between the physician, therapist, psychiatrist, and the
Department of Social Services (the "DSS"); bi-monthly announced

Otolaryngology Perspective, 118 ARCHIVES OTOLARYNGOLOGY HEAD & NECK SURGERY 584,
588 (1992).
162. McGuire & Feldman, supra note 33, at 289.
163. Id. at 291-92.

164. Id. at 291.
165. J.H. was one of six children who took part in a study on the psychologic morbidity
of children subjected to MSBP. Id. at 290.
166. Id.
167. In re Aaron S., Nos. N-671-92, N-676-92, N-678-92 and N-677-92, slip op. at 37
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. Suffolk County Feb. 22, 1993).
168. McGuire & Feldman, supra note 33, at 292.
169. In re Jessica Z., 515 N.Y.S.2d 370, 378 (Fain. Ct. 1987).
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and unannounced visits by the DSS; and the granting of authority to

the DSS to immediately remove Jessica from her home if any of
these safeguards were violated. 7 '

Children cannot protect themselves from the abuse they receive;
thus, it becomes the legislature's job to protect them. Each state
should adopt New York's res ipsa loquitur standard which provides

that "[p]roof of injuries sustained by a child or of the condition of a
child of such a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained or exist
except by reason of the acts or omissions of the71 parent . . . shall be
prima facie evidence of child abuse or neglect."'

This standard constitutes a rebuttable presumption 72- in which
only the burden of production shifts.' 7' First however, the state must
satisfy two elements: (1) proof of injuries (2) that would ordinarily
not be sustained or exist except for the acts of the parents. 74 Once
these prongs have been met, the burden of production then shifts to

the parent to offer a satisfactory explanation as to the child's injuries. 175 The ultimate burden of persuasion will always remain with

the petitioner.
Proof of a child's injuries could consist of hospital records, po-

lice and social service reports, photographs, and x-rays. Although this
standard may appear harsh, the second element limits the first to

injuries that would "ordinarily not be sustained"'76 by a child. For
example, a child may have a broken arm and the x-rays show the
break as being the type associated with a fall,'

or it could show a

spiral fracture which is "not a common childhood injury.' ' 78 Anoth170. Id.
171. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(ii) (McKinney 1987). Courts in other states have
disapproved of the use of this standard. See In re Jertrude 0., 466 A.2d 885, 888 (Md. CL
Spec. App. 1983) (chastising the lower court for coming "dangerously close" to applying a
res ipsa loquitur rationale).
172. In re Sais, 404 N.Y.S. 2d 507, 508 (Fam. Ct. 1978); In re J.R., 386 N.Y.S. 2d
774, 779 (Fam. Ct. 1976).
173. hI re Tashyne L., 384 N.Y.S. 2d 472, 474 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
174. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(ii).
175. Tashyne L.,472 N.Y.S.2d at 474.
176. FAM. CT. ACT § 1046(a)(ii).
177. John M. Leventhal et al., Fractures in Young Children: Distinguishing Child Abuse
Front Unintentional Injuries, 147 AM. J. DisEASEs CHILDREN 87, 92 (1993); Susan A. Thomas et al., Long-Bone Fractures in Young Children: Distinguishing Accidental hjuries From
Child Abuse, 88 PEDIATRIcs 471 (1991).
178. United States v. Lingle, 27 M.J. 704, 705 (A.F.C.M.R. 1988); People v. Martin, 4
Cal. Rptr. 660, 664 (1992) ("A spiral fracture never occurs in a simple fall, and in a [three
year old] child . . . it is usually caused by someone else."); see United States v. Curry, 31
M.J. 359, 363 (C.M.A. 1990) (a doctor explaining the difference between the tendons and
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er example of an injury not ordinarily suffered by a child would be
dehydration caused by massive amounts of sodium in the child's
system or excessive diarrhea caused by laxatives.
The adoption of this standard will enable children to be, at least
temporarily, removed from abusive environments in an expeditious
manner. This will go a long way in preserving the life, health, and
safety of children." 9
V.

CONCLUSION

MSBP is a form of child abuse that goes tragically unnoticed,
and is thus not properly addressed by the legal system. Every state
should recognize MSBP as a form of child abuse and prosecute abusers accordingly.
When MSBP abuse is discovered before irreparable harm is
done, family court will most likely be the proper forum for the case.
In family court settings, New York's evidentiary standard of res ipsa
loquitur should be adopted by all states. This will go a long way to
ensure that abused children are protected.
Unfortunately, as with most forms of child abuse, MSBP can
lead to death. In criminal cases that result from such deaths, the
prosecutor should not have to prove that the defendant has MSBP. It
should be enough to show that this was the form the abuse took. For
example, if a child is physically abused, evidence presented will show
that the parent, either with her own hand or an instrument, struck the
child. Here, the parent directly causes the abuse. On the other hand,
with MSBP abuse, the parent abuses the child by indirectly causing
physical abuse through unnecessary medical procedures. The evidence
will show that the child was admitted to various hospitals over an
extended period of time, that there is no medical diagnosis for the
illnesses presented at admission, and that the child's symptoms disappear when the parent is denied contact. Since MSBP is the nature of

bones in adults and children could only give one explanation for a fourteen week old boy's
fractured tibia bone: that it occurred by grabbing and jerking the leg); United States v. Irvin,
13 MJ. 749, 752 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982) (the physician's testimony established that a two year
old girl's injuries "because of their type, location and nature . . . could not have resulted
from accidental causes").
179. Children are often sent home from the hospital because the doctor is hesitant to
label the child as abused. See M. Elaine Billmire & Patricia A. Myers, Serious Head Injury
in Infants: Accident or Abuse?, 75 PEDIATRICS 340 (1985). Unfortunately, many of these
children die at the hands of their abuser. See. e.g., Lingle, 27 MJ. at 705; Curry, 31 MJ. at

367.
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the abuse, psychological testimony concerning a definition and the
general characteristics of the syndrome should be permitted. This will
enhance a jury's understanding of the abuse, and will assist it in
rendering a decision beyond a reasonable doubt.
As a legal community, we have an obligation to protect those
who cannot protect themselves. Children are a prime example of this
group, and their protection and well-being should be of the utmost
importance to us.
Tracy Vollaro
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